



PART ELEVEN

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOLSHEVIKS AND THE COMINTERN APPLIES THE LEFTIST POLICY TO MONGOLIA







We already wrote about the attempts of the Soviet Communist party and the Comintern to put pressure on the Mongolian leaders by supporting “rural” party members. The session of the Political Bureau of the Communist party held on January 5, 1928 decided to “support rural leftists” and to “establish a secretariat on Mongolian issues at the Comintern”¹. At its session of February, 1928, the Politburo discussed the ECCI’s plans with regard to organizational questions, such as its intention to unite the leftists within the MPRP, and decided to create short-term training courses at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East for officials from Mongolian aimags and hoshuuns.² Thus the staff to disseminate the ideas of the Soviet Communist party and the Comintern was trained and appointed to administrative positions.

Meanwhile, several Mongolian leaders, headed by Ts. Dambadorj, did not accept two resolutions of the Comintern, which, in their view, did not reflect the peculiarities of Mongolia and the Mongolian people. This is why in June 1928 the Soviet Politburo twice discussed the question of recalling the permanent representative of the Comintern in Mongolia.³ The “socialist experiment” in Mongolia was not fulfilled either by the representatives of the Soviet CP or that of the Comintern; this is why they decided to intervene directly into the domestic affairs of Mongolia. In other words, it was decided to appoint an extraordinary commission of the Soviet party and the Comintern with the aim of replacing the so-called “rightists,” that is, the followers of the national democratic orientation who were headed by Ts. Dambadorj, N. Jadamba and others.

Thus the Soviet leaders concluded that the policy line of the Mongolian party and government would not represent interests of the workers. Moreover, the Mongolian leaders expressed an interest in

¹ RGASPI.f. 17, Op.162, kh.n.6

² RGASPI.f. 17, Op.162, kh.n.25

³ RGASPI.f. 17, Op.162, kh.n.103,110





developing contacts with capitalist countries, which, in the opinion of the Soviets, undermined the struggle of the leftists against the feudals (nobles). At the 42nd session held on September 10, 1928, the Soviet leaders decided to appoint a special envoy commission of the Comintern on Mongolian affairs, which was to be dispatched to the Congress of the MPRP.⁴ The goal of this special envoy commission was to support rural leftists and guide them in accordance with the political and economic program elaborated by the Comintern. The head of the commission was B. Smeral, a leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Other members of this commission were MacDonald, a member of the Communist Party of the United States, Amagaev (who was previously known as the representative of the Comintern in Mongolia), a secretary, a translator, and others.

This information was discussed at a session of the MPRP CC on September 18, 1928. The Mongolian leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that Amagaev, who in 1926-1927 had falsely informed the Comintern about Mongolia and played a negative role by undermining the authority of the party leadership, was a member of the commission arriving to Mongolia. But the Comintern did not accept their protest, and in late September 1928, the ECCI delegation arrived in Mongolia.

From this time on and during the preparations for the VIIIth Congress of the MPRP, the activities of the leftists, who called themselves “defenders of the official party line,” underwent a substantial intensification. Just after the arrival of the Comintern delegation, a document entitled “The objectives of the left wing of the party” was issued, which for many years was known to have been elaborated on the basis of the struggle of all basic party organizations fighting against “rightists.” But at that time the document was known as the proposal of Genden and Badrakh.

At the IIIrd plenum of the MPRP CC (December 1928), a delegate named Baldandorj criticized that the document entitled “The objectives of the opposition” was not formulated by the Mongolians independently but merely copied the resolution of the Comintern. This criticism was rejected by Comintern representative

⁴ RGASPI.f. 17, Op.162, kh.n.129





Smeral, who declared: “Baldandorj is committing a serious error of principle”.⁵

In July 1928, U. Badrakh, one of the leftists, sent a letter to Pavel Mif, the head of the Eastern Department of the Comintern, in which he pointed out that he was “ready to accept the direction and instructions of the Comintern.” He asked Mif to send a Mongolian translation of the aforesaid Comintern resolution, which was then rejected by Dambadorj. We may conclude that the proposals of Genden and Badrakh did not reflect the peculiarities of the development of Mongolia, and the document issued by “the defenders of the party line” merely copied the experience of other countries. The objectives were not elaborated on the basis of discussions with party organizations and party members but simply translated into Mongolian and signed by 29 persons, whose names were written in Russian, and probably submitted to the sessions of the CC and the conference. The proposal of Genden and Badrakh was included in “The objectives of the opposition,” which emphasized “democratic centralism.” As early as 1927, Amagaev called on Dambadorj to take steps toward “eliminating the post of party chairman and electing secretaries equal in their rights and daily responsibilities.” The policy of leftists like Genden and Badrakh emphasized “supporting the poor and middle classes, not allowing the ownership of private property, and developing socialist property.”⁶

In a speech he made at the IIIrd plenum of the Central Committee, CC Chairman Ts. Dambadorj declared: “In accordance with the resolutions of the IIIrd Congress, our party rejected the capitalist principles and is continuously moving toward socialism. But this goal was falsified in the ‘Political objectives’ of Genden and Badrakh.” Actually, Dambadorj and others incorporated into the resolution of the IIIrd Congress the thesis that “the party will pursue policies that are in conformity with the actual international situation and adopt principles appropriate for the people’s interests without a re-orientation toward capitalist development.” But this line encountered difficulties, because the leftists opposed the national

⁵ MAKhN-yn To'v Khoroonь 1928 onь 3 дугаар бу'гд хурлын тогтоол UB., 1928, Deed devter

⁶ MAKhN-yn тогтоол, шийдвер, баримт бичгууд, 1 хоти, UB., 1981 он.





democratic line of the party. Their document, “The objectives of the opposition,” was supported by the participating representatives of the Comintern. Genden and Badrakh kept repeating that there were no major differences between their concept and the line of the CC, but in reality their activities were in opposition to the party leadership. Thus in October 1928 there existed two sharply opposing conceptions in the political arena of Mongolia: on the one hand, the so-called rightists headed by Dambadorj, and on the other hand, the leftists headed by Genden and Badrakh, who enjoyed the support of the special envoy commission of the Comintern.

We may see from the aforesaid events that the conception of Genden and Badrakh faced protests from the reasonable forces of the party – the followers of the national democratic orientation – and was strongly criticized by them. For example, at the IIIrd CC plenum held in 1928, Demchigdorj, Tsedendamba and others criticized the thesis of Genden and Badrakh, according to which “the right wing was used by foreign powers for intervention into the domestic affairs [of Mongolia],” and asked them to concretize their false charges. They also criticized Genden’s proposals concerning the elimination of the post of CC chairman and the nomination of secretaries for daily responsibilities, and asked whether the chairman of the party had special rights in comparison with other leading members.

Some participants of the plenum asked whether the situation would improve if the proposed changes were carried out.

In response, Genden made the following statements at the plenum:

“Four members of the CC and other members of the party elaborated these political objectives, and we do not think that the resolutions of the congress and conferences of the party were incorrect. We would note only that in the course of implementing the decisions of the Vth congress, some members of the CC misinterpreted the resolutions and thus falsified some decisions.

In 1927 Amagaev, a representative of the Comintern under the CC of the party, sent information to the Comintern without the permission of the CC, after which the Comintern issued a resolution





on Mongolia. The fact that this resolution had a number of definitions not corresponding to the conditions of the country is to be explained by the background of the resolution.”

Genden went on to say that “we were criticized for meeting with the representatives of the [Soviet – O.B] Communist Party. It may be explained as an attempt to enter into an alliance with China. Consequently, many old books were published, such as *A Magic Cadaver* or *The Lights of Sunrise*, which were taught in schools. This is also an example of misleading people. Thus the extraordinary conference of the party held in April 1928 had a unique goal to assist us, Genden and Badrakh.”

The analysis of the speeches made by P. Genden and others shows that they described the rightists’ efforts to gain more independence from the Soviet Union and the Comintern as an attempt to enter into an alliance with China and Japan. The leftists all made efforts to mislead the people and bring them to their side.

Summarizing the debates of the IIIrd CC plenum, Comintern representative Smeral said that “the party has fallen into a deep crisis. [This crisis] has its reasons and deep roots. This is why it is very important to understand and correct it. If it is understood in a wrong way, it will affect the party. Our Commission thinks that the members of the CC did not understand it correctly. During the debates two different policies emerged. First of all, I must notice that the divergencies within the party are regarded as a private confrontation between Dambadorj, Genden and Badrakh. It is very important to acknowledge that it is not a private question. The second trend is also wrong. Some people said that the divergencies are created by the Comintern. Also the debates showed that there are reasonable people within the party who denounced that there are growing doubts in the Comintern.”

This was an example of the Comintern imposing its leftist ideas on the Mongolian leadership and undermining the free debates during the conference. It is very regrettable that this process was not adjusted. Instead, the people who realized this dangerous trend were replaced and dismissed.



Smeral described the social and economic situation in Mongolia, defining it as the second stage of the revolution, after which, thanks to the successful struggle against feudals (nobles), would start the third stage of the revolution - the new stage of non-capitalist development. He also noticed the emergence of a capitalist economy in Mongolia with the differentiation of classes, and linked these factors with the creation of the so-called rightist danger within the party: “The rightist tendencies undermined the progress of the revolution, which met public indignation. The manifestation of this [indignation] was the struggle of leftists, the proposals made by Genden and Badrakh. The party leaders underestimated the danger of rightist tendencies. Moreover, they did not accept the instructions of the Comintern as stated in the letter of Petrov”.⁷ His words were received with great satisfaction by the leftists, who criticized Dambadorj and others for “secretly wanting to secede from the Comintern.”

Smeral, who played such a crucial role in the decision of the domestic affairs of Mongolia in 1928, visited Mongolia the second time in 1934 and participated in the IXth Congress of the party. Since this period, Mongolian propagandists linked the name of Smeral with the friendship between the Mongolian and Czechoslovak peoples, and wrote that “the Mongolian people regard him as one of their best friends, who helped them as an internationalist and as an eminent representative of the international Communist and workers’ movement.”

After his second visit in Mongolia, in a report he sent to the meeting of ECCI members in Moscow on 10 November 1934, Smeral wrote the following: “Mongolia is important for us in three main respects.

First of all, Mongolia is a underdeveloped country which we may help in economic development, a country in which Soviet Russia and the international revolutionary movement may practice its ideas. This is a country that is important from the point of view of the ideas of the Communist International. On the other hand, Mongolia has strategic importance for Soviet Russia. This country has a territory of 1,290 thousands of square kilometres, which is

⁷ Namyn to'v arkhiv. f.4, d.2, kh.n.405



similar to the total territory of Germany, France and England. Mongolia has long common borders with Eastern Siberia, and if Japan has such influence in Mongolia as we (Comintern and Soviet Russia) have, Japan will pass across the half of the Siberia till Lake Baikal, and from here they will march 400 kilometres in a few days and arrive in our country. Thus Mongolia is very important in a strategic sense. In addition, Mongolia is a supplier of raw materials for us.

Last year we imported 20 thousands of cattle, 200 thousands of sheep and a considerable volume of wool from Mongolia, and this year our import will increase. All these factors increase our interests in Mongolia.

This huge country is populated only by 800 thousands of people. We may get this country cheaply”.⁸ Here I quoted only some parts of his speech.

Thus Smeral was one of those foreign Communist leaders who wanted to change the national democratic orientation of Mongolian development and to apply their leftist ideas to Mongolia.

During the conference, a question arose: “How to defend the country if the Japanese militarists intervene and which country may be our supporter?” Ts. Dambadorj gave the following response to this question: “If the reactionary forces intervene, we must defend [our country] by all means and acknowledge which country may be our friend or enemy, and particularly we must defend ourselves from the reactionary forces of Japan and China and obtain the support of the main force of the world revolution, the friends and supporters of Mongolian revolution.” His words revealed that the “rightists” did not adopt a single position with regard to Mongolia’s relations with foreign countries but took into consideration the various internal and external factors and sought a peaceful solution. On the other hand, we must point out that the rightists, thanks to their national democratic ideas, developed a clear policy and correctly evaluated the international situation.

⁸ RGASPI.f. 495, Op.152, d.153





One of the outstanding leaders of the rightists, J.Tseveen, said that Mongolia “must become a neutral country recognized by Soviet Russia and China and by all other countries of the world, a case similar to Switzerland.”

History has showed that a neutral policy would be very challenging for the political and economic development of Mongolia. This is why the rightists visited both Soviet Russia and China, and wanted to cooperate with Great Britain, France and Japan as well. Another manifestation of this policy was a document issued by the MPRP CC on September 15, 1926, which said: “This time we will not send students to Japan, but we send such students as Natsagdorj, Pagmadulam, Sanj, Puntsag, Luvsandulam, Luvsanchultem and others to German.”

But we must emphasize that the leftists always wanted to accelerate the pace of development, which produced a negative effect on Mongolian domestic politics. This was also the conclusion drawn by the Soviet Communist party and the Comintern.

“The objectives of the opposition,” a document issued by the leftists, pointed out that “because of the policy of the party was to tolerate Buddhism and its dissemination among party members, the political activities of the lamas were reinforced.” Concerning this conclusion, Dambadorj said the following: “In the real conditions of Mongolia, we must be very careful with the religion of the people; this is why we may make a mistake if we spread anti-religious propaganda. Instead, we must do careful work by educating [the population] and raising their awareness. It will be difficult to use anti-religious propaganda; of the ten thousand members of the party, there are very few people without religious beliefs.

Recently, when Manzushir lama arrived in Urga among the priests, there were a high number of praying people, including party members, particularly rural ones. Most of us continue praying. It will be very hard to impose accountability on all people; thus the Congress must discuss whether the time is appropriate to use anti-religious propaganda”.⁹ His speech revealed the real spiritual

⁹ MAKhN-yn 4 ikh khural, UB., 1976





behavior of many party members and ordinary Mongols. It was also a reasonable statement made by a Mongolian leader, acknowledging the wishes of the population.

Just after the IIIrd CC plenum, the MPRP held its VIIth Congress, which lasted a month and a half. The Congress adopted a resolution that changed the national democratic orientation of the country. Of course, this congress was organized by the representatives of the Comintern. The authors of the third volume of *The History of the Mongolian People's Republic* (1969) wrote the following about the congress: "The congress roundly denounced the rightists - Ts. Dambadorj, N. Jadamba, J. Gelegsenge, J. Tseveen –, re-affirmed the party line of following a non-capitalist way of development, and defined the ultimate aims of deepening the people's revolution".¹⁰ In *The History of the MPRP* (1985), the following was written about these events: "The impact of the resolutions adopted at the VIIth Congress of the party was to reject the party line of following a non-capitalist way of development and to undermine the deepening of the people's revolution, and denounced the right wing breaking the rapprochement of the MPRP with the world revolutionary movement [please clarify this sentence]".¹¹ Such diametrically opposite definitions require a more detailed analysis of the impact of the VIIth Congress on the history of Mongolia.

Defining the future of the MPRP, the VIIth Congress pointed out that "the party is an authentic people's revolutionary party, and its main goal is to carry out a political reform of the country towards socialism, obtaining the support of the poor and middle classes composed of arats".¹² This definition was based on the leftist document entitled "The objectives of the opposition." The other resolutions of the congress and the leaders appointed by the congress also revealed the fact that the VIIth congress became a mere tool of the special envoy commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. These events also demonstrated that the Soviet Union and the Comintern directly interfered in the domestic affairs

¹⁰ BNMAU-yn tu'ukh. Gutgaar boti, 1969 on

¹¹ MAKh-yn товч ту'укх, UB, 1985 он

¹² MAKhN-yn 7 их khural., UB, 1980 он, kh.225





of Mongolia, and the Mongolian leaders became a compliant instrument in their hands.

The proposal of Genden and Badrakh to develop Mongolia by progressing towards socialism was criticized by Gombo, a delegate of the Congress, who said: “The rural people do not understand the goal of marching towards socialism; there are many disputes over this subject; this is why I propose to postpone this issue and finalize upon listening to the public opinion and unifying efforts of the people.” But the leftists, who enjoyed the support of the Comintern, compelled the delegates of the congress to adopt the socialist conception for the development of Mongolia.

For a long time, the following was written in historical books: “The right wing launched the slogan ‘Get rich’, which falsified the political line of the party and was aimed at leading the country by following the incorrect way of promoting private interests and the private economic sector of the country.” Most of the Mongolian books that were published before 1990 came to the following conclusion: “The rightist slogan ‘to get rich without the exploitation of others’ was actually aimed at supporting the emerging capitalist elements.” Thus we may ask today: What do we know about this slogan?

At the Vth congress of the MPRP, held in September 1926, J. Tseveen supported the speech of Dambadorj: “We must not prohibit [people] from getting rich if it is beneficial to the people.” He also stressed that “the members of our party must work hard and make efforts toward making all people prosperous and fighting against poverty. Among the members of the party, there is still no one who wants to enrich himself without caring about other people.” Thus he emphasized that the word “get rich” must be understood correctly; it means to enrich all people but forbid them to exploit others. ”If all people will be extremely poor and only a few people will be very rich, it means that the policy is wrong.”¹³

At the second CC plenum held in 1928, S. Buyannemekh said the following: “In Mongolia there are no rich people who exploit others; but there are people with a considerable number of cattle who

¹³ MAKhN-yn 5 dugaar ikh khural., kh.117





are still considered rich. In reality, this is not a property accumulated by the exploitation of other people. Since ancient times the Mongols were not exploiting others, nor were they exploited, [but] lived in a spirit of collectivity. That is, if we now make a step ahead, it will be the socialist mode of life”.¹⁴

Nevertheless, if we analyze the speeches of J. Tseveen and S. Buyannemekh, their slogans “everybody should get rich”, “all people are equal” meant that each household, every person must have a prosperous life. This was a common concept of the leaders of the party and the government.

All people whose aspiration was to “get rich” were to be replaced by the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on Mongolia (issued on January 24, 1927), in which it was said: “some officials in charge of the expropriation of [feudal] property launched for the first time the slogan ‘get rich’, which is not appropriate at this time and may become very dangerous to the general line of the party policy. The main negative impact may be that in the course of economic development, those who make business will be connected with economic interests and in consequence the party will have to transform and change its program. Thus the eventual effect of this policy of ‘getting of rich’ will be to enrich a small number of the persons responsible for the economy and to impoverish the majority of arats.”

The Comintern criticized the party and government policy that was aimed at allowing people to enrich themselves, and imposed its line which pointed out that “the party must oppose the policy of enrichment and conduct a policy aimed at creating cooperatives of mutual aid and state factories and other state organizations responding to the interests of the people.” From today’s perspective we may say that this was a manifestation of the centralized economic policy of concentrating all power in the hands of the state, undermining the efforts to develop any form of private property, and discourage competition, entrepreneurship, and private initiative.

¹⁴ MAKhN-yn To’v Khorooni 2 bu’gd khurlyn togtool, UB, 1928 on. kh. 180





This is why Dambadorj and other Mongolian leaders opposed this policy, wanted to explain their standpoint to the officials of the Comintern their positions, and sent G. Gelegsenge, B. Dugarjav, and Dambadorj to Moscow.

One may ask what sort of attitude the Comintern's special envoy commission adopted toward the slogan "get rich." We may see it from the speech Smeral made at the VIIth Congress of the party, in which he said the following: "The party must rely on the correct line of the revolution and lead the people toward the way of bypassing capitalist development. In my opinion, the Congress clearly recognized that this way was very different from Buyannemekh's statement about the slogan "get rich". This slogan is presented not only by him but also by a group of leading officials of the party and the government, expressing their illusory hopes".¹⁵ Smeral's speech was a manifestation of the Comintern's action against the national democratic conception of the Mongolian leaders and its determination to impose an absolutely different orientation on the country.

The so-called "rightist danger" was the question of "pan-Mongolism" i.e., the idea of unifying all Mongols. Article 2 of the "Ten Political Aspirations", which were adopted at the first Congress of the Mongolian People's Party, stressed: "Whether the Mongolian people can live peacefully and go forward acknowledging the contemporary international culture depends on the creation of the independent nation-state. Mongolia would never accept foreign domination. So the ultimate aspiration of the Mongolian People's Party is to unite all Mongolian nation in a single state." This was a goal to create a nation-state, proclaimed by the national revolution of 1911. The leaders of the Mongolian People's Party wanted pursue their foreign and domestic policies in accordance with this goal, but they encountered many obstacles.

In the first years of the revolution, the Mongolian party and government leaders pursued a policy aimed at "spreading the ideas of the party across all Mongolia with the ultimate objective of unifying all Mongolia and regaining Tannu-Tuva, which was annexed by the

¹⁵ MAKhN-yn 7 ikh khural. UB., 1980 on, kh.116





Russian Emperor, asking Soviet Russia about its standpoint with regard to Mongolian unification, and having a right not to ask for the permission of Russia and China.” This was the policy of those days.

Thus the issue of Tannu-Tuva was raised. In 1924, at a CC meeting that was to make a decision on sending a representative and instructors from Mongolia to Tannu-Tuva, Ts. Dambadorj, B. Tserendorj and J. Tseveen said the following: “If Tannu-Tuva is to become an independent state and it will be recognized by our country, this would be similar to a child’s trick. You are making an unwise proposal when you expect [us] to recognize its independence, forcing the people of this country, who are of the same race, religion and traditions as [we] Mongols, [to become independent] in spite of their wish to join Mongolia after their liberation from foreign occupation”.¹⁶ I think that the term “in a unified family,” which was used by the Mongolian leaders in those days, is similar to the contemporary notion of “nation-state,” but I must also point out also that this term was also used by the Manchus for the various parts of the Qing empire. Still, the notions were quite different. The Mongols used this term only for one nation – the Mongols.

In the mid-1920s, the hopes to unite Mongolia and Tannu-Tuva failed, and the Comintern’s decision to create a new state succeeded. As Amar and Jadamba, who were defeated in the debate, said: “Is the creation of an independent state so easy?”

A unified nation has more opportunities for the development of national culture. If a nation is divided, this produces a negative impact on the development of its traditions, language and culture. This is why we may say that the political aspirations of the people should have been carefully considered for the future of the Mongolian nation.

The standpoint of Ts. Dambadorj and J. Tseveen was not accepted by the Comintern, which instructed the Mongolian leaders to “oppose to the attempts to unite the Mongolian nation.”

We must also stress, however, that there were some persons within the Comintern who thought otherwise. For example, Bukharin

¹⁶ Namyn to’v arkhiv. f.4, d.2, kh.n.65., kh.9-10





was of the opinion that the unification of the Mongolian nation would be useful. In a session of the ECCI, Petrov, a leader of the Comintern's Eastern Department, declared that "Outer Mongolia's wish to re-create the old Mongolian Empire is very dangerous. This is why we must immediately stop these big-power ambitions; the Mongols must live separately and independently [from each other]." Bukharin, then a member of the ECCI, disagreed with Petrov's opinion, and said the following: "In the report of Petrov, there is a very false conclusion that 'Outer Mongolia's wish to re-create the old Mongolian Empire is very dangerous.' The unification of a nation and its freedom is in accordance with our goals. If Outer and Inner Mongolia, Buryatia, and Uriankhai [later Tannu-Tuva – O.B.] unify and achieve freedom, we must not oppose it. On the contrary, we must help them to fight together against the reactionary forces".¹⁷ For this reason, Bukharin proposed to issue a resolution about the unification of all Mongols. But his proposal was not supported by others, and later it gave a pretext to his opponents to call him "rightist."

The Mongolian leaders Ts. Dambadorj, B. Tserendorj, N. Jadamba, A. Amar, and J. Tseveen were described by the leftists as "followers of pan-Mongolistic ideas." At the VIIth Congress of the party, Smeral stressed that "in the last years, Mongolian nationalists became blind. Comrade Tseveg correctly said that the nationalist ideas or pan-Mongolistic ideas aimed at uniting the Mongolian nation are wrong and harmful. Revolutionary patriotism is completely different from chauvinism".¹⁸ He described Mongolian "rightist" national democratic ideas as a manifestation of chauvinism. In other words, the unification of a nation was considered a nationalistic idea opposed to revolutionary ideas. As U. Badrakh, a representative of leftists, said, "The main teacher of pan-Mongolism" was "J. Tseveen, that old wolf of the revolution." Others, such as Dambadorj and Jadamba, were "influenced by his reactionary ideology." That is, the resolution that the VIIth congress of the MPRP passed on "pan-Mongolism" was in accordance with the instructions of the Comintern.

¹⁷ MAKhN-yn To'v Arkhiv, Komintyerny matyerial

¹⁸ MAKhN-yn 7 ikh khural., UB, 1980 on, kh.225





From the beginning of the CC plenum held on October 10, 1928, there were sharp contradictions and heated debates between the leaders and delegates, who constituted small factions struggling over positions. Most of the population was excited; various rumors circulated among soldiers and ordinary citizens about that “a Japanese ambassador arrived in Manchuria and departed for Mukden,” “there are many Chinese soldiers in Manchuria and they want to help the ‘rightists’ during the VIIth party congress,” “Dambadorj may escape, he recently sent his Chinese wife to Beijing, which explains his pro-Chinese standpoint,” “The soldiers of the Red Army and the students of the party school must be careful about this,” “The car and weapons of Losol and Hayankharvaa, the comrades of Dambadorj, must be given back.” Even the delegates of the congress and the CC plenum were not immune to such rumors.

All these rumors influenced the leadership’s decision to declare that the “rightists” were “enemies of the party and the government.” For instance, a persistent rumor was that “Damba will run away... this is why we must bring back his car.” In such a nervous atmosphere, unfriendly relationships manifested themselves openly among the leaders of the party and government.

I must say that this atmosphere influenced not only the delegates but also the observers, and produced a very negative effect on the following events. This is a big lesson for all leaders of all times who assume responsibilities on behalf of the people. The history of Mongolia is rich in such lessons.

For example, such leaders as Bodoov and Danzan were unjustly executed right after the victory of the national democratic revolution.

During the fierce debates that took place at the plenum, Dambadorj told Bazaron [Who was this person? Please identify him]: “Maybe this evening I will not participate in the meeting. I think that the history of Bodoov will be repeated”.¹⁹ He certainly remembered all too well how Mongolian Prime Minister Bodoov and other fifteen politicians were executed in August 1922. Dambadorj was indeed dismissed after the plenum, and he was also exiled from Mongolia.

¹⁹ MAKhN-yn To’v Arkhiv, Komintyerny material





A Soviet Politburo meeting held on October 11, 1928 discussed the matter of “changing the composition of the Mongolian government and removing Dambadorj from the leadership.” At another meeting held in November 1928, a resolution was passed on the dismissal of Dambadorj and Jadamba.²⁰

The question of dismissing Dambadorj from his post was secretly discussed by the Comintern commission during the VIIIth congress, and a decision was made in accordance with the will of the headquarters. The representatives of the Comintern thought that if Dambadorj was merely dismissed, this might prove counterproductive and lead to the spreading of the national democratic ideas of the “rightists.” For this reason, they decided to send Dambadorj to “study” in the Soviet Union, whereas N. Jadamba was sent to the USSR to work as a commercial representative of Mongolia.²¹ Accompanied by Smeral and the other Comintern representatives, they had to leave Mongolia soon after the VIIIth congress, on December 16, 1928.²² Dambadorj was never allowed to return to his homeland.

At the VIIIth Congress, Smeral said the following about the situation in Mongolia: “Frightened of the intensification of the revolutionary process, the leaders of the rightists, [instead of] developing the revolutionary ideas among party members and the arats, tried to stop the process. This fact revealed that the right wing is leaving the path of revolution.” He added: “This rightist danger is not confined to a few leaders of your party, but you must also destroy, first of all, its economic foundations by fighting against the newly created rich people and all reactionary forces in the country.” This was his advice concerning the struggle against the “rightist danger.” He repeated his conception about the non-capitalist development of Mongolia, which he had first outlined at the IIIrd CC plenum. (1928). He advised the Mongolian leaders to “develop the state and cooperative sectors of the economy with the assistance of the Soviet Union, to gradually liquidate the capitalist and feudal sectors, and go forward on the non-capitalist path, which means:

²⁰ RGASPI.f. 17, Op.162, d.7., kh.3-4

²¹ Namyn to’v arkhiv. f.4, d.1, kh.n.29

²² RGASPI.f.495, Op.152, d.64





- create voluntary cooperatives of cattle-breeding among the poor and middle arats;
- compel feudals and monasteries to give a part of their cattle to the cooperatives;
- take action in the industrial, finance, monetary, lending and transport sectors.

If your party really wants to have links with the Comintern, the aforesaid tasks are those that the Comintern is carrying out”.²³ Actually, the Comintern put strong pressure on the Mongolian leaders. Smeral’s words were aimed at frightening the MPRP leaders and preventing any attempt to break with the Comintern. In essence, he stated that even the mere existence of the party would have been impossible without the Comintern.

Following his arrival in Mongolia and summarizing his activities after the VIIth Congress, Amagaev, another representative of the Comintern, pointed out: “The VIIth Congress was very important to outline the current and future tasks of the poor and middle arats.” Meanwhile, Smeral stated: “Thanks to the frank criticism of the delegates, the VIIth Congress rectified the course of the revolutionary party, eliminated the rightist danger, and defined the right way of the revolution”.²⁴

The aforesaid tasks were not in accordance with the life of Mongolian people, and a few years later they produced an obviously negative impact on the lives of the Mongolian people. The rightists understood this situation and defended their national democratic conception of development, but they were defeated. Thus the leftists, who sought to construct socialism, gained the upper hand in this ideological battle, which lasted an entire month. Following the VIIth Congress, a policy of imitating foreign models began. The congress also eliminated the posts of chairman and deputy chairman of the party, electing three secretaries of equal rights. This created an opportunity for the election of new party leaders who would faithfully carry out the resolutions of the Comintern. In fact, the new Mongolian leaders were selected at a meeting of the representatives

²³ MAKhN-yn 7 ikh khural. UB., 1980 on, kh.116

²⁴ MAKhN-yn 7 ikh khural. UB., 1980 on, kh.116





of the Comintern, at which no Mongolian was present. Having been instructed by the Comintern, the VIIth congress “elected” U. Badrakh, P. Genden and B. Eldev-Ochir as secretaries of the Central Committee.

This decision was formally approved by the ECCI, which passed a resolution on March 1, 1929, pointing out: “we must appreciate the decision on the dismissal of the old leaders,” “the VIIth Congress’ decision to reinforce the struggle against feudals (nobles) and the forces of clerical reaction was a step ahead.” From this period on, it was strongly emphasized that the MPRP had to work under the direct leadership of the Comintern.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern elaborated a detailed program that reinforced the leftist policy, and on September 3, 1929 sent it to the MPRP CC by a special envoy named V. Kuchumov. The program stressed that “the main organizational goal of the party is to become an authentic mass party, increasing the number of poor and working arats amongst its members.” “You must elaborate a unified program for developing Mongolia on the non-capitalist path, on the way of socialism.” “You must develop socialism in a very short time, and for this purpose [you should] apply the experiences of the Soviet Union [to Mongolia], elaborating a five-year plan of development.” Kuchumov met each leader of the party and the government, and gave advice concerning the letter of the Comintern.

The aforesaid instructions of the Comintern were reflected in the decisions made at the VIIIth congress of the party (1930), and became a theoretical basis for the regime’s actions. The VIIIth congress declared: “We are now confiscating the property of the feudals, creating cooperatives and communes, and entering into the stage of developing the state sector of the economy according to the socialist principles; we consider that the beginning of the three-stage revolution.” So we may see the wrong conclusions that the Comintern representatives drew concerning the situation in Mongolia. These wrong conclusions were reflected in the Comintern’s resolutions and in the speeches of its representatives, such as Smeral’s speech that was also reflected in the documents of the MPRP. This is an example of copying the experiences of the Soviet Union concerning the





construction of socialism without taking the peculiar economic and social conditions of Mongolia into consideration. The decision of the VIIIth congress to issue a resolution on fighting against the basis of feudal economy and creating cooperatives was certainly wrong. The fact that the MPRP leaders blindly followed the decisions of the Comintern was a main cause of that the wrong decisions made by the leftists became increasingly numerous.

But the communes and cooperatives created after the VIIIth Congress were not in accordance with the real situation of Mongolia; this is why some delegates, such as Sodnom from Tsetserleg Mandal aimag and Jamts from Chandmani aimag criticized this policy. On the other hand, the VIIIth Congress also passed some useful resolutions on the production of raw materials and the creation of industrial units. In addition, the government established a Ministry of Trade and Industry, which was responsible for foreign trade. Foreign trade became a state monopoly in order to ensure the economic independence of the country.

Because the external situation of Mongolia was tense, the aforesaid decision was taken in order to strengthen the country's independence and reinforce national security. The government also decided to negotiate with the Soviet leadership about the training of Mongolian workers in the USSR and to launch a campaign against illiteracy.

In this period of leftist dominance, the poor and lower classes were given priority in accordance with the instructions of the Comintern. This is why a campaign was launched for the "purification" of party and government organizations. As CC Secretary Z. Shijee said, "now 75 per cent of party members are representatives of the poor classes and members of trade unions. In other words, the party is composed of only one class".²⁵

All these policies - the confiscation of the property of feudals, the campaigns against monasteries, the creation of cooperatives and communes, the purge of party and governmental organizations – were carried out under the direct guidance of the Comintern and

²⁵ Namyn to'v arkhiv. f.4, d.4, kh.n.166



its representatives, such as V. Kuchumov and Chernomorduk. These measures resulted in the confiscation of the cattle of wealthy herdsmen and a growing discontent among the people. As a consequence, in 1929 the wealthy herdsmen of Jargalant sum (Delger Khushun, Khantaishir aimag) attacked the administrative buildings and destroyed the lists of debts.²⁶

The protests took various forms. For example, at the end of 1930 many households fled by crossing the borders of South Gobi and Altai aimags. In August 1931, a certain Senguelder, who lived in Ulziit sum (South Khangai aimag), reported that “the last autumn, Ochir and a number of other households fled with their property.” Rumors circulated about that many households were emigrating and on their way they forced the cooperatives to give them their property, saying that “if you are confiscating our property, we will do the same thing.” The captured cooperative members were bound by the rebels, who said: “Your Russians will come and liberate you”.²⁷ Massive emigration continued until mid-1932, affecting primarily Khovd, Bayan-Ulgi, Gobi-Altai, Bayankhongor, Uburkhangai, Sukhbaatar, East Gobi, Central Gobi, Eastern, South Gobi and Khubsugul aimags (The names of aimags given by present time-O.B). – That is, every aimag that had common borders with China or the Soviet Union. Among the refugees, there were lamas, feudals (nobles), and members of the party and the Youth League. According to some sources, at least 7,542 households, i.e., approx. 30,000 people left Mongolia in this period. Most of these people returned home in 1932 when the party leadership re-examined its failed leftist policies. Some archival sources indicate that these people were against the confiscation of the property of rich people and against the interference of the representatives of “red imperialism” (this is how they called the Soviet instructors and specialists – O. B.) in the internal affairs of Mongolia. It is worth doing further research on this subject and specifying the total number of refugees.

²⁶ Namyn to'v arkhiv. f.4, d.3, kh.n.99., kh.9-14

²⁷ Namyn to'v arkhiv. f.4, d.4, kh.n.75., kh.60




Protests became increasingly frequent, and the fact that the party pursued a policy of discrimination on the basis of class status became the main cause of rebellion against the party and the government. There were also some representatives of high lamas (monks), who took advantage of the mistakes made by the regime to reinforce their own positions. For example, a certain Daramba Guendenjamts sent the following letter to the Panchen Lama: “Now our religion faces many enemies. They are breaking the laws of religion and also the laws of nobles. We will support the ancient traditions of the law of religion and the law of nobles.” The participants of the rebellion used these slogans: “We, the followers of the Bogd will carry the yellow banners. Long live the cause of the yellow soldiers!”, “Fight against the witches and demons, [who are called] the people’s government, to the death!” At this time, rumors were spreading among the population about that “the Panchen Lama is coming to save the suffering population,” “The yellow soldiers occupied the capital city and are arriving here.” In these conditions of instability, the leaders of the party and the government could not adequately evaluate the situation.

In 1930, a rebellion broke out in Ulaangom and Tugsbuyant monasteries. A commission headed by CC Secretary Eldev-Ochir was sent there to suppress the rebellion. On March 31, 1930, the members of the Central Committee discussed a telegram sent by Eldev-Ochir, gave him permission for the public execution of the leaders of the rebellion, and instructed him to “introduce emergency measures in Ulaangom and Tugsbyant monasteries,” “execute the rebels and the party and Youth League members who participated in the rebellion.” However, the repressive measures taken by the party and the government did not yield any positive results. On the contrary, the regime lost the respect of the people.





Prime minister of Mongolia B.Tserendorj, Deputy prime minister A.Amar, Minister of Army S.Marsarjav, Head of Army's council E.Rinchino, 1920s



J.Tseveen



A.Amar



Prime minister B.Tserendorj, Chairman of Central committee of MPRP, Speaker of Parliament P.Genden, 1927



M.I. Amagaev



G. Gelegsenge



S. Buyannemekh





B.Tserendorj, N.Jadamba, A.Amar, H.Choibalsan



Z.Shijee



U.Badrakh





PART TWELVE

REBELLION OR PEOPLE'S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST THE PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT

